M&A deals create more value for acquiring firm shareholders post-2009 than ever before. Public acquisitions fuel positive and statistically significant abnormal returns for acquirers while stock-for-stock deals no longer destroy value. Mega deals, priced at least $500mil, typically associated with more pronounced agency problems, investor scrutiny and media attention, seem to be driving the documented upturn. Acquiring shareholders now gain $62 mil around the announcement of such deals; a $325 mil gain improvement compared to 1990-2009. The corresponding synergistic gains have also catapulted to more than $542 mil pointing to overall value creation from M&As on a large scale. Our results are robust to different measures and controls and appear to be linked with profound improvements in the quality of corporate governance among acquiring firms in the aftermath of the 2009 financial crisis.
Introduction
One of the most stylized facts in the corporate finance literature is that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of listed companies tend to destroy value for acquiring firm shareholders more often than they create. During the previous two decades this empirical observation has been recurrently highlighted by academic and market research as well as the business press. 1 Considering that deals involving listed firms are typically subject to extensive publicity and investor scrutiny, and that their high failure likelihood and associated challenges have been extensively documented and deliberated, it is puzzling that they regularly fall short of creating shareholder value. This paper aims to examine how value creation from acquisitions has evolved more recently in light of important developments that can potentially impinge on the quality of corporate investment decisions.
One of the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis -the worst in recent history -is that it put internal control mechanisms, corporate cultures, executive compensation and risk management processes on the spotlight (see e.g. Gupta and Leech, 2015; Ittner and Keusch, 2015) . Accordingly, its aftermath has seen an unprecedented regulatory overhaul, a surge in shareholder activism and litigation cases, as well as government-driven reform efforts, initially focused on financial institutions, fuelling revisions targeted at all U.S. listed companies.
2 In addition, the on-going evolution in corporate governance in the post-financial crisis era is not merely confined to mandatory reforms but characterised by a more pervasive shift towards the voluntary adoption of practices (e.g. more efficient incentive structures, greater director specialisation and diversity, increased emphasis on the risks associated with strategic goals, the rise of "stakeholder democracy", and information technology governance) that aimed to enhance the value-creation mechanism and convey more confidence to the public. Such extraordinary developments have the potential to positively influence the quality of corporate investment decision making associated with inorganic growth and, in particular, the strategic 1 See for example Mueller (1997) , Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) , Damodaran (2005) , Bruner (2002) , Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) , Boston Consulting Group (2007) , Betton et al. (2008) , among others. 2 The Dodd-Frank reform act that passed in 2010, although aimed primarily at financial institutions, it also enhanced the effectiveness of monitoring and governance systems for all U.S. listed companies by introducing new mandatory disclosure rules, fine-tuning executive compensation, granting more powers to shareholders and bolstering the accountability of executives and directors.
selection, synergy justification, deal implementation, and post-merger integration processes, implying the need for a thorough investigation of acquisition investments post-2009.
To that end, we study the characteristics and performance of M&As during a previously unexplored recent period and draw important comparisons with the two decades of the 90s and A compelling 54% of public deals is now associated with positive acquirer abnormal returns relative to only 39% in the previous decade and 43% during the 90s. The return differentials are prevalent among both cash and stock financed deals, while this is to our knowledge the first time a study documents non-value-destroying stock-for-stock deals for acquirers within a U.S. sample. By any measure, acquiring firms create more value for their shareholders post-2009. This performance turnaround seems to be associated with bidders piecing together deals of superior strategic fit. The overall synergistic benefit has improved markedly -more than three-fold-during the most recent period, with the average deal being subject to a 4.51% or $309 mil combined gain for acquiring and target companies; to our knowledge among the highest ever documented by any recent U.S. study.
The documented shift in acquirer returns for public acquisitions is so significant that they now generate comparable gains to private ones, contradicting conventional wisdom that bidders in private deals outperform those acquiring listed targets by a large margin. Although, transactions involving private targets continue to generate significant gains to acquirers during the most recent period, they do not benefit shareholders more on average than in previous decades. As a result, any improvement in deal quality is confined only to acquisitions of listed targets which tend to be substantially larger, subject to heightened media attention and have been historically more susceptible to value destruction. This is consistent with the fact that public acquisitions are likely to entail a greater degree of reputational exposure for corporate executives and directors, making them more susceptible to improvements or regime shifts in corporate governance (Dahya et al. 2016 ).
To gain further insight on this issue we also investigate a sub-set of 3,150 completed M&A deals valued at least $500 mil (henceforth "mega-deals"). 4 During the last 25 years mega-deals comprised more than 85% (94% in 2015) of our overall M&A sample's market value representing the bulk of inorganic corporate investment and an important part of the U.S.
economy (more than 5% of GDP in 2015). The historical tendency of M&As to fail is more accentuated among large acquisitions with a number of recent studies pointing out that "megadeals" priced over $500 mil or $1 bil end up costing shareholders more. 5 A plethora of sizeable mergers and acquisitions, from the frequently quoted landmark deals of AOL-Time Warner,
Daimler-Chrysler and HP-Compaq to more recent ones such as Rio-Tinto-Alcan, Bank of America-Countrywide, eBay-Skype and Kmart-Sears to name a few, have all been branded as 4 The mega-deal classification was motivated by the fact that the breakpoint for the top deal value quintile of all US M&As during our sample period is around $500 mil. It also does not affect the direction of our results or main conclusions which are similar when the mega-deal threshold is set to $250 mil, $750 mil or $1 bil. although employing a higher threshold reduces the size of this sub-set substantially. 5 A report by the Boston Consulting Group (2007) shows that "mega-deals" with a value of more than $1 bil destroy nearly twice as much value as smaller deals, while Bloomberg (2002) reports that 61% of merger deals worth at least $500 mil end up costing shareholders. In a more recent study McKinsey (2012) finds that only large deals are on average subject to negative abnormal returns, especially among faster growing sectors. The Financial Times (2015) also posit that expensive mega-deals are damaging for everyone, except for top executives and financial advisors. Alexandridis et al (2013) report a striking $518 mil loss for acquiring shareholders in the average large deal between 1990 and 2007.
failures since they resulted in sizable write-offs and shareholder losses. 6 Since mega-deals have been linked to large scale losses for acquiring shareholders, they tend to involve a higher degree of reputational exposure for firms, top executives, and the board of directors. We find that the improvement in gains to acquiring firms post-2009 is significantly more pronounced in mega deals, with the average acquirer being subject to an abnormal return of 2.54%, corresponding to a $62.3 mil gain for its shareholders. The synergistic gains in this case amount to a thumping $542 mil in the average deal. Moreover, the compelling shift in acquirer returns during the most recent period is not confined only to public mega-deals but also applies to private onesalbeit to a lesser extent-suggesting that the improvement is driven larger deals in general. Cross sectional regressions controlling for a range of pivotal acquisition-gain determinants, as well as industry and company fixed effects confirm that the bulk of the improvement in acquisition gains post-2009 stems from mega-deals. A possible explanation for this result is that any positive developments in the aftermath of the financial crisis and especially in corporate governance has mainly impinged on sizable investment decisions where agency conflicts are more substantial given the larger value at stake and higher degree of reputational exposure for corporate executives and directors. This would naturally result in larger deals being more reflective of improvement in M&A quality.
Our findings are consistent with a recent shift in the quality and drivers of M&A deals and point to value creation from large M&As on a great scale, contradicting the status quo that such type of acquisitions destroy value more often than they create. A number of indicators suggest that the documented turnaround is concurrent to a more widespread change in the investment behaviour of firms and corporate executives. A measure of CEO over-optimism based on executive stock options exercise in acquiring firms, which has previously been associated with value-destroying acquisition investments (Malmendier and Tate, 2008) , indicates that hubristic behaviour has diminished significantly during the last few years. The fundamental change in M&A drivers and motives, as well as how top executives view acquisitions, is also evident from the fact that synergistic benefits are quoted by acquirers as part of M&A announcements more than twice as often relative to the past. Finally, a measure of overall investment efficiency 6 Several explanations have been put forward for why large deals fail to pay off more frequently, with the most prevalent ones being overpayment (Loderer and Martin, 1990) emanating from hefty private benefits (Jensen, 1986, Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007) or adverse managerial traits such us overestimation of the top executives' ability to extract acquisition gains (Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2008) and integration complexity, including cultural incompatibility, which can hamper post-merger integration (Shrivastava, 1986; Hayward, 2002; Ahern, 2010; Alexandridis et al., 2013) .
that takes into account acquisitions, CAPEX, R&D, as well as asset disposals based on Richardson (2006) shows that the extent of over-and under-investment has significantly receded post-2009. This implies that corporate decision makers have aimed towards more optimal investment allocation in recent years, which bonds well with our main findings on value creation from M&As.
The fact that the documented improvement in corporate investment behaviour and quality occurred in the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since 1929 suggests that our results can in theory be driven by this hefty shock. Ensuing changes at the corporate internal control and monitoring levels in response to the emergence of a more shareholder-centric environment deserve special attention. Although some anecdotally reported developments (e.g. greater focus on director specialisation and experience, strategic risk management and value creation) are not directly quantifiable due to the limited availability of information at the firm level, we examine the impact of more conventional dimensions of corporate governance that are likely to capture any broad trend for change. We document recent surges in acquiring companies' board independence, the ownership of independent directors and equity based compensation of their top executives, along with a decline in anti-takeover provisions. To investigate whether and to what extent the superior performance of mega-deals post-2009 can be attributed to changes in these governance proxies we isolate their exogenous pre-to-post financial crisis variation by employing a two-stage instrumental variable approach. The evidence is consistent with the conjecture that our 2010-15 time indicator is a strong predictor of changes in corporate governance, which, in turn, can explain acquirer returns. This in turn corroborates that developments at the corporate board level have an important role to play through fostering more accountability and restraint in the executive suite, leading to superior acquisition decisions that deliver larger synergistic benefits and cater for more of the aggregate gain to be channelled to acquiring shareholders.
Our study marks a milestone for research on mergers and acquisitions as well as the effects of the 2008 financial crisis on corporate decision making. The documented findings pose a challenge to the status quo in the acquisition gains literature and are consistent with a structural shift in the quality and efficacy of corporate investment, manifested in M&A decisions that deliver higher returns to shareholders than ever before. From the seminal work of Travlos (1987) and Loderer and Martin (1990) to the more recent evidence provided by Fuller et al. (2002) , Moeller et al. (2004 Moeller et al. ( , 2005 , Betton, et al. (2008) and Alexandridis et al. (2013) , the general consensus has been that public acquisitions, and particularly large ones, destroyed value for acquiring shareholders more often than they created for more than 30 years. Our work brings to light for the first time that this trend may have come to an end and that acquiring firms consummating public acquisitions more recently increase shareholder value on a sizable scale, in accordance with the predictions of the neoclassical theory of M&As (Ahern and Weston, 2007) . 7 Most notably, the documented improvement in acquisition gains is for the most part concentrated in larger deals -both private and public -which tend to be associated with more pronounced agency problems, investor scrutiny, media attention and reputational exposure.
Along these lines, to the extent that the turnaround in M&A performance is driven by the recent developments in internal control mechanisms, our study offers significant contribution to existing literature on the quality-enhancing role of corporate governance in acquisition decisions (Masulis et al. 2007; Dahya, et al. 2016) . To the best of our knowledge, it is also the first study to provide evidence of the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis on corporate investments, which leads up to a broader intuition; large-scale financial shocks can ultimately have favourable ripple effects on focal aspects of corporate decision making, bolstering the value creation mechanism. The latter notion is consistent to the stylised argument on the benefits of "creative destruction" (Schumpeter, 1942) , which highlights the ability of modern economic systems to reconfigure themselves via extraordinary events, so that value-destroying ventures and practices are abandoned in favour of novel, wealth-increasing ones.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and sample statistics. Section 3 reports the main empirical results including a multivariate analysis of acquirer returns and synergy gains. Section 4 presents the results from a propensity score matching approach. Section 5 utilises a two-stage instrumental variable approach to examine the impact of corporate governance and Section 6 provides evidence on the overall investment efficiency of acquiring firms. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
Data and Summary Statistics
The sample of M&As is from Thomson SDC and includes U.S. deals announced between 1990
and 2015. We exclude repurchases, recapitalisations, self-tenders, exchange offers, 7 Along similar lines, some recent studies have also found evidence pointing to significant net economic benefits from M&As using non-traditional measures of value improvement (see Bhagat et al., 2005 and Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016 Figure 1 show the distribution of deals over time. Deal activity decelerated as a result of the 2007-08 financial crisis that brought the sixth merger wave (see Alexandridis, et. al, 2012) to an end but recovered again in 2010 and has remained upbeat until at least 2015.
The rebound is significantly more pronounced in terms of the total dollar deal value during the last two years in the sample and reached $947 bil in 2015; a 15-year high. Mega-deals -worth at least $500 mil -comprise more than 85% of the total dollar value invested in M&As by U.S. acquirers in our sample during the last 25 years ($12.5 tril) and 94% in 2015 ($891.4 bil). This indicates a tendency towards larger acquisitions during the most recent period.
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here]
To gain further insight into the sample's sectoral composition we also examine if there are any significant differentials in the industry classification of firms targeted in acquisition deals between the most recent period in our sample (2010-15) and the previous two decades. For brevity we have not tabulated the results since we find only trivial differences. One pattern that stands out is the increase in acquisition activity within the healthcare and pharmaceuticals segment (from 9.6% to 13.2% of the overall sample). This can be largely attributed to the fact that several pharmaceutical companies struggled to cope with expiring patents on a number of key drugs ("patent cliff"), thus turning their attention to M&As in order to meet investor growth expectations (Fortune, 2015) . 9 The ultimately withdrawn $160 bil Pfizer-Alergan deal in 2015 was the largest ever announced within the sector. Moreover, the utilities and telecom industries have also recorded slight declines in deal activity through time, which is not surprising given that they have progressively become more mature and saturated. where the median deal is sponsored with more than 55% cash.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Further, the percentage of diversified deals (DIVERS) has decreased only in public deals over time, while the share of cross-border deals (CROSS-BORDER) has increased across the board. This is not unexpected given the race for globalisation as well as the tendency of U.S.
companies to expand more in emerging markets in order to enhance their growth prospects.
Another interesting observation is that there are fewer failed deals ( 
Main Empirical Results

Univariate analysis of acquisition gains
As a first step in the analysis of acquisition gains we study a comprehensive set of value creation metrics. (2015) and estimated as the ratio of total market capitalisation change for the acquirer and target around the acquisition announcement adjusted for market movements and scaled by the deal value, also points to large improvements in combined value creation during the most recent period. 15 First, our findings are consistent with the surge in synergy related motives reported in Table 2 and suggest that acquirers carried out by and large superior deals, with better synergistic prospects during the most recent period.
Second, returns to target companies (TCAR) have also increased proportionately and thus the additional synergistic gains seem to be captured by both acquiring and target firm shareholders.
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The fact that an improvement in M&A value creation is documented only for public acquisitions -and not for private -yields interesting implications. Deals involving listed targets tend to be larger and associated with a higher degree of reputational exposure given the heightened media attention they typically receive (Dahya, et al. 2016) . Moreover, the value destruction reported in prior M&A literature primarily applies to this sub-set, rather than private deals-something we also confirm in this study. It is therefore possible that any greater effort or restraint among corporate executives and boards in response to shifts in governance quality are concentrated in sizable investment decisions where the tendency to destroy value was more of a problem in the first place and agency conflicts are more substantial. In this case, larger deals would be more reflective of a significant shift in M&A quality and value creation due to the more material impact of a sizable consolidation on the acquiring firm and its share price.
To gain further insight on the impact of deal size in driving our results we repeat the univariate the analysis in Panel B for a sub-set of 3,150 mega-deals priced at least $500 mil. 17 The differentials in Panel B between the two periods are significantly more pronounced. The mean (median) ACAR for mega-deals in 2010-15 is a resounding 2.54% (1.34%); an increase of 2.90
(1.72) percentage points relative to 1990-2009. 18 Although, for brevity, results are reported for all mega-deals -private and public -together, in an untabulated test we also confirm that abnormal returns are higher for private mega-deals, although to a lesser extent (by 0.68%) than We control for key variables that have been shown to affect acquirer returns. These are: i) the occurrence of a public deal (PUBLIC) to account for the fact that acquisitions of listed targets tend to be associated with lower acquirer returns (Fuller et. al, 2002; Faccio et. al, 2006) ; ii) an all-stock dummy (ALL STOCK) to control for the negative abnormal returns associated with acquisitions of listed targets paid for entirely with stock (Travlos, 1987) ; iii) the natural logarithm of the acquiring firm's market cap (ASIZE) to account for the negative effect of acquirer size on acquirer returns (Moeller et al., 2004) , iv) the target-to-acquirer relative size (RELSIZE) since larger public deals are evidently subject to more negative abnormal returns (Alexandridis et. al, 2013) ; v) the acquirer market-to-book value (M/B) given the firm misvaluation implications for bidders (Moeller et. al, 2005; Dong et. al, 2006) , vi) a competing bid variable (COMPET) to capture the potentially negative effect of competition on the gains to acquiring firms (Bradley et al., 1988) ; vii) a control for takeover hostility (HOSTILE) since it tends to be negatively associated with acquirer returns (Schwert, 2000) ; viii) a diversification dummy variable (DIVERS) equal to one when the acquirer and target have different 2-digit SIC codes to account for the fact that diversifying acquisitions have been found to destroy shareholder value (Morck et al, 1990) ; ix) a cross-border indicator (CROSS-BORDER) equal to one when the target is outside the U.S. since higher announcement returns are documented for acquisitions of foreign targets (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005 ); x) a serial acquirer control (SERIAL) which accounts for the fact that multiple bidders tend to make worse acquisitions (Fuller et al., 2002 and Billett and Qian, 2008) ; xi) the acquiring firm's leverage (Maloney et al., 1993) and FCF ratios (see e.g. Jensen, 1988; Lang et al., 1991) ; xii) a high market valuation indicator (HIGH MKT VAL) equal to one when the deal is announced during a month with an abnormally high de-trended market P/E ratio as in Bouwman et al. (2009); finally, we control for industry and company fixed effects where relevant. Table 5 reports the regression results.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The coefficient of the 2010-15 indicator variable in regression 1 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Deals carried out during the latest period are subject to a 0.45%
higher ACAR after controlling for other known acquirer return determinants, which confirms the recent turnaround in acquisition gains reported in Section 3.1. This superior performance is largely attributed to the sizable improvement (by 1.86%) in acquisitions of public targets (regression 2) since returns for private deals are not significantly higher during the most recent period (regression 5). Moreover, the trend in public acquisitions seems to be in turn driven by the subset of mega deals (regression 6) where a much higher increase in CARs of 3.6% is recorded. Even private mega-deals fare significantly better post-2009 (regression 7) albeit the difference there is relatively smaller (0.84%). Overall, cross sectional regressions confirm that the tendency of M&As to generate more value for acquiring shareholders is significantly more pronounced among larger deals.
In regressions 2, 4 and 9 we examine whether the inclusion of company fixed effects has an impact on our results. Golubov et al. (2015) report that firm fixed effects alone explain at least as much of the variation in acquirer returns as all the firm-and deal-specific characteristics Thus, the documented turnaround in acquisition performance is unlikely attributed to specific extraordinary acquiring firms.
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The univariate results presented in Table 3 [Insert Table 5 here]
To ensure that the relationships documented in Table 4 are not driven by extreme CAR observations we also run quantile regressions estimated at the median and other percentiles (25 th and 75 th ). Table 5 reports the quantile analysis for mega deals for brevity, although we check that results are similar for the sample of all public deals as well. The magnitude of the 2010-15 time indicator varies but it remains statistically significant at the 1% level in all 6 specifications.
Acquisition gains based on propensity score matching
To control more directly for observable differences in the deal characteristics between deals consummated during the most recent period and prior to this we employ a propensity score matching (PSM) technique. Essentially, this approach produces close matches of post-2009 deals to pre-2010 counterpart transactions on the basis of their similarity, and then compares their gains. As a first step we use a logit model to estimate the impact of all firm and deal characteristics utilised in Table 4 on the likelihood of a deal being part of the post-2009 subset. Panel A of Table 6 reports the regression results for mega-deals since this sub-set in particular appears to be driving the documented improvement in acquisition gains. In untabulated analysis we confirm that results are similar for the sample of all public acquisitions.
Several variables are important in differentiating 2010-15 deals from their counterparts. For instance, post-2009 deals are less likely to be public and financed entirely with equity as seen in specification 1. They also tend to be associated with less hostility and competition among bidders, and are more likely to be consummated during high valuation months, consistent with the summary statistics reported in Table 2 . The PUBLIC coefficient in specification 1 implies that the probability of observing a public deal in 2010-15 is 39% less (82% less for a stock-forstock deal).
[Insert Table 6 here]
Panel B reports the PSM results for both performance proxies (CAR and SYNRGY) based on two different techniques: i) the nearest-neighbor matching; and ii) the Gaussian kernel matching. Propensity scores are estimated from regressions 1 and 2 respectively. Deals are matched on the basis of their nearest (one-to-one), thirty, and fifty neighbors. Treated sample CAR corresponds to post-2009 CARs and Control CAR to the matched deals' CARs. Both acquirer and synergy gains for the treated samples are higher than the control sample ones, and the differentials range from 1.7-1.9% for CAR and from 2.9% to 3.9% for SYNRGY, all significant at the 1% level. Overall, our results on alternative nearest predicted probability matching approaches corroborate that mega-deals completed during the latest sample period outperform very similar deals from the previous two decades. Therefore, unless there are important characteristics not captured in the first step of the approach, the outperformance of more recent deals seems to be largely robust.
Do developments in corporate governance drive the results?
Although we report a compelling pattern in the data pointing to unprecedented improvements in the quality of M&A decisions following the 2008 financial crisis, questions remain on the ultimate driving force that induced such a sharp shift. One possibility is that the developments that occurred in response to the crisis at the corporate governance level can potentially affect how directors and executives approach the selection and implementation of acquisition opportunities, as well as the degree of their accountability toward shareholders in carrying out value-increasing investments. The widespread collapse of trust among capital providers, the government, and the general public regarding the operation of financial institutions had also ripple effects for non-financial institutions, putting corporate governance for all listed companies on the spotlight. The ensuing reforms, as part of the Dodd-Frank act passed in 2010, introduced new mandatory disclosure rules, re-aligned executive compensation, bolstered the accountability of corporate top executives and granted more powers to shareholders. However, these mandatory reforms, might in fact account for less than half the story, with anecdotal evidence attesting to a much deeper and ubiquitous urge for change among listed companies, especially the most sizeable ones.
Accordingly, the aftermath of the recent financial crisis has seen a shift towards the voluntary adoption of practices such as more efficient incentive structures, greater director specialisation and diversity, increased emphasis on the risks associated with strategic goals and operations as well as the rise of "stakeholder democracy" and information technology governance, all aiming to enhance the value creation mechanism and convey more confidence to the public. Such profound changes in internal control mechanisms can potentially induce more shareholdercentric decision-making and -in view of the role corporate boards play in M&A decisions (Deutsch et al., 2007; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001 ) -exert a positive influence on the selection and justification of acquisition investments as well as the deal implementation and post-merger integration processes, thereby bringing about widespread improvements in acquisition gains. Since some of the aforementioned developments in corporate governance are not directly measurable or quantifiable due to the limited availability of information at the firm level, we focus on some more conventional dimensions that are nonetheless capable of capturing any broad trend for change. These are board independence (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999) , the stock ownership of independent directors (Bhagat et. al, 2008) , and the BCF antitakeover provisions index (Bebchuck et al., 2009). 20 To examine whether the improvements in corporate governance documented in Table 3 with regards to mega-deals are to any extent associated with the positive relationship between acquisition gains and our post-financial-crisis indicator, we employ a two-stage regression approach as in Dahya et al., (2016) . Although the crisis in itself may be seen as an exogenous source of variation in corporate governance, partly addressing potential endogeneity concerns, the two-stage approach is necessary in order to isolate the effect of this exogenous component and determine whether the ultimate source of acquisition gains is associated with the pre-topost crisis variation in corporate governance. Table 7 presents the results from the instrumental variable estimation.
[Insert Table 7 There are of course other concurrent developments emerging at the same time which might be captured by our time indicator in the regressions. For instance, changes in the psychology of corporate leaders due to a sense of enhanced visibility that might reinforce restraint, expedite learning from prior mistakes and foster a focus towards value creation, along with a surge in shareholder activism and litigation associated with mergers and acquisitions, can all impinge on the quality of investment decisions. 22 Although these drivers may be seen as directly or indirectly related to the governance-regime change discussed above, we recognise that if acquirer returns are affected by the time indicator other than through its effect on governance then the exclusion restriction in our two-stage approach would be violated. Consequently, our results on the effect of corporate governance need to be interpreted with caution.
To more directly quantify the impact of a change in board independence -our main governance proxy -on acquisition gains we employ a diff-in-diff approach for a sub-sample of 172 acquirers that have consummated at least one mega-deal both pre-2010 and post-2009. We rank these acquirers based on their change in board independence from the fiscal year end prior to the year of their last deal in the pre-2010 period to the fiscal year end prior to the year of their first deal in 2010-15 (∆BI). Then we also estimate a corresponding ∆ACAR for each pair.
Acquirers in the top ∆BI quintile are subject to an average (median) increase in ∆ACAR of 3.03% (1.89%) and those in the bottom quintile experience a decrease in abnormal returns of -2.03% (-2.47%), with the differences being significant at the 1% level. We can therefore conclude that firms with the highest increases in the representation of independent directors on their boards manage to improve their deal making. Conversely, those that experience deterioration in corporate governance continue to destroy value. The direction of our findings is also similar for the other two measures of corporate governance, IDO and BCF.
Has overall investment efficiency improved?
22 The probability of directors being sued by investors for a major merger decision they made has reached 90% in the recent period (Lajoux, 2015) , while about 97% of all deals larger than $100 mil result in litigation battles (Gregory, 2014) . Therefore, directors are more incentivised to perform their fiduciary duties to the best of their abilities, to avoid the negative publicity and other repercussions of an adverse decision in the court of law.
Our analysis so far has focused on the effects of M&As on share prices. Although this is a standard approach for assessing value creation from acquisitions, it offers little information on how efficiently firms allocate funds to investment opportunities relative to their growth prospects. More importantly, if firms make better acquisition decisions they should have also become more efficient in other investments, such as CAPEX and R&D or divestitures. To that end, we employ a measure of acquiring firms' residual investment, RESINV, which captures the investment that diverges from the its expected level, given a set of factors that have been shown to predict the optimal investment level (see e.g. Richardson, 2006; Biddle and Hilary, 2006 Compustat, scaled by prior-year book value of total assets. The independent variables are estimated at the end of the previous fiscal year t-1. Q is the market value of the firm (market value of equity and book value of debt) over total asset value. Leverage is the ratio of total debt over book value of equity. Cash is the log of total value of cash and equivalents. The company
Age is in logarithmic form and it is calculated by the incorporation date as displayed in
Compustat. Size is the log of total asset value. Stock Return is the percentage change in the market value of equity for the past year. We also include the previous year's INV term. FE corresponds to industry fixed effects. The absolute value of the residual from the investment efficiency equation, εi, is the residual investment measure, RESINV, and it reflects the extent of investment inefficiency.
[Insert Table 8 here]
A lower value of RESINV for acquiring companies post-2009 would provide a strong indication that firms have become more meticulous in the allocation of capital to investment 23 INV and all explanatory variables are estimated for each acquiring firm-year in our sample period. So, a bidder completing a mega-deal in 2004 will be included in the regression for all 26 years subject to data availability. This is because the purpose of this test is to examine the efficiency of all firm's investments, not just M&As. In addition, focusing on M&A years only would produce inflated investment figures. Nonetheless, including acquiring firms in the test only once, at their acquisition announcement year, still produces similar results.
opportunities. Table 8 The improvement in the quality of acquisition decisions is more pronounced among megadeals where even private target acquisitions are received better by the market during the most recent period. We also provide evidence of acquiring firms employing more efficient investment allocation strategies, manifested in lower degrees of over-and under-investment.
These changes in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis coincided with significant developments in the corporate governance environment, which have the potential to foster increasingly optimal investment decisions that cater for shareholder value creation more than ever before. Our evidence suggests that the higher acquisition gains can be at least partly explained by the variation in conventional governance characteristics.
The documented findings mark a milestone in existing knowledge about gains from acquisitions and, in accordance with the neoclassical theory of M&As, challenge conventional wisdom that acquiring firms destroy shareholder value more often than they create. They also imply that a financial crisis of grand scale and its shockwaves can ultimately contribute towards the more effective monitoring of corporate investment decisions as well as the associated implementation process, bringing sizeable gains to shareholders. The table shows the annual number of deals and total consideration offered for public and private M&A deals. The sample is from SDC and includes completed and withdrawn deals announced between 1990 and 2015. Repurchases, recapitalisations, self-tenders, exchange offers, acquisitions of remaining interest, minority-stake purchases and intracorporate restructuring are excluded. Transactions have an inflation-adjusted value of at least $5 mil and the targetto-acquirer relative size is at least 1%. The acquirer owns no more than 20% of the target prior to the announcement and seeks to own more than 50% following completion. Acquiring firms are U.S companies listed in NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with data on CRSP. Targets are public or private firms. The figure shows the annual number of transactions and the aggregate dollar value for the M&A sample described in Table 1 Richardson (2006) for a sample of mega-deals priced $500 mil or more. In Panel A, the coefficients are from a regression of Total New Investment, INVi,t, which is the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions minus sales of PPE and necessary maintenance for assets in place for firm i in year t from Compustat, scaled by total assets. Qi, t-1 is the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by book value of total assets for firm i in year t-. Leveragei, t-1 is calculated as total debt over common equity for firm i in year t-1. Cashi, t-1 is the logarithmic transformation of 1 plus the ratio cash and cash equivalents over total assets for firm i in year t-1. Agei, t-1 is the log of the difference between the year of the observation and the incorporate date for firm i in year t-1. Sizei, t-1 is the logarithmic transformation of total assets for firm i in year t-1. INVi, t-1 is the lagged term of the dependent variable. Stock Returni, t-1 is the total annual change in the market capitalization of firm i in the year t-1. We trace each acquirer's investment for the entire sample period . Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% to remove outliers. Industry fixed effects are included in specification 2. Panel B reports mean and median residual investment (RESINV) which is the absolute value of the residuals from regression (2) in Panel A. n is the number of firm-year observations and Adj. R 2 (%) is the adjusted R-square. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Year
RELSIZE
The ratio of deal value over the acquirer market capitalisation one month prior to the acquisition announcement.
SYNRGY MOTIVE
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the Deal Purpose Code in SDC which is derived from actual acquisition announcements includes synergistic gains (Code: SYN), and 0 otherwise. TIME COMPLET. The number of days between deal announcement and completion.
WITHDRAWN
Dummy takes the value of 1 if the deal was eventually withdrawn and 0 otherwise.
Panel E: Investment Inefficiency Regression
Age The logarithmic transformation of the difference between the year t-1 and the year of the incorporation.
Cash
The logarithmic transformation of 1 plus the ratio of company cash and cash equivalents over total assets in year t-1.
Leverage
The ratio of company total debt over the book value of common stock in year t-1.
Q
The company book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets in year t-1.
